研究会（独り）振り返り祭り： 第六回 - マイケル・リンチのイアン・ハッキング評その２

承前。2006年4月2日。id:contractio:20060402

セッション３．

• Lynch, M., 2001 "The contingencies of social construction," Economy and Society, 30(2), 240-254.

セッション３

ハッキングの二著作の書評。

The Social Construction of What?

Mad Travellers: Reflections on the Reality of Transient Mental Illnesses

笑うところ。

• 10 In a reply to critics, Searle (1997*: 103) proposes that there ought to be a ‘philosophy of society’ that would explore questions about the nature of society and the relation between society and the individual. He fails to mention that there is a field known as ‘social theory’ in which those questions are central, though no doubt they are handled differently than Searle would advise.
• 11 Kingsley Davis (1959), in a presidential address to the American Sociological Association, argued that functionalism had become so prevalent in his field that many of the standard arguments against it could easily be absorbed as variants of functionalist arguments. The same could be said for constructionism, as demonstrated by a parody of Davis's article delivered during a conference on constructionism (Lynch 1996). [p.252]

* Searle, J. (1997) 'Replies to critics of The Construction of Social Reality', History of the Human Sciences 10: 103–10.

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causation / symptoms

Though linked with anti-psychiatry and labelling theory, Goffman (1971) did not discount the possibility of underlying medical pathologies for ‘mental’symptoms. Rather than advocating ‘social’ causation in place of ‘physical’ causation, Goffman (1971: 354–5) recommended a shift in perspective. In the place of the somatic surfaces attacked by disease agents, he called attention to the communal and organizational interfaces upon which symptoms manifest.¹⁷ [p.247]

17 Goffman employed a distinction between illnesses which have (or are publicly believed to have) definite ‘physical’ causes, and those that are indistinguishable from their symptoms.

• • Like Hacking's distinction between interactive and indifferent kinds, Goffman's distinction enabled him to focus on symptomatic categories that are clearly, and perhaps exclusively, located at the surface of individual experience and interpersonal interaction.
  • Unlike Hacking's distinction between kinds, Goffman's distinction turned on the surface manifestation and moral significance of symptoms.
    For Goffman, both physical and mental illness can result in symptoms that offend public order, but he defines symptoms of mental illnesses as essentially ‘wilful situational improprieties’ (Goffman 1971: 355). He does not discuss the expanding domain of neuro-behavioural disorders, an intermediate category that confounds his qualitative distinction between physical and mental illnesses.

「ゴフマンの分析が「表層」を動いている」と述べるその前に、しかしそもそも、ハッキングのほうの概念についての（or 「文法的」な）分析が「深層の」分析に見えてしまう ってのはどうしてか、という問題が問われる必要がありましょう。それはちっとも自明なことではありますまい。id:contractio:20080111

「深層的」という言葉を使っているのはハッキング自身なので、ここでリンチが、その言葉を使うこと自体はなんらおかしくないんだけどね。

ルーピング： 自然種と相互作用種との絡み合い

ゴフマンも「ループ」について語ったことがあるよ。

Although the cognate terms mask significant differences, it is possible to draw a relation between Goffman's conception of ‘looping’ and Hacking's more general account of the distinctive attributes of ‘interactive kinds’.

• Goffman describes a specific, organizationally situated, type of interaction.
  • His account of a dehumanizing and demoralizing process presupposes that the subject of looping’ is a conscious, reactive person, and not an indifferent thing affected by a causal process. And yet an unresolved tension between being a person and constructing a thing is essential to the interactional dynamics of looping.
  • Caught in the noose of this looping effect, the subject of power learns to extinguish any overt resistance to the administrative effort to refashion her being as a docile object.¹⁹
    • The stilling of protest arising from the noviciate’s ‘fastidious soul’ is part of a constructive process that begins with an interactive kind (a person) and trains her to behave like an indifferent organizational thing.

... In Hacking’s terms, Goffman's ‘mania’ is an interactive kind, subject to looping effects that objectify that ‘kind’ as a locus of personal identity and professional intervention... [p.249]

「相互作用種」というのは、「ループ効果」（←それは パーソナル・アイデンティティと専門的介入の locus としての「種」を対象化するものだが）を話題にするための概念だよ。

リンチによる批判の焦点

• What Goffman provides that Hacking fails to incorporate into his historical account is that
  • the interaction is not limited to relations between historically specific professional categories and the lives of individuals.
    Available professional categories are a crucial part of the historical and cultural background,
  • but they are not the only contingency in the ‘career’ of the person so categorized.
• For Goffman the moment of ‘labelling’ arises in the course of an extended and densely textured series of interactions between individuals in families, work groups and other organizations.
• The most salient question for Goffman is
  not: how do the category and its subjects change historically, when patients, clinicians and others incorporate it into their lives and social relations? Rather, it is:
  how does the category become relevant, initially, at different times, and in different ways, in the life of a person?

重要だが ためにする批判 に見えなくもない微妙な主張。

＞識者 they are not the only contingency in the ‘career’ of the person so categorized. の contingency って──書評タイトルだ──なに？

→識者にご教示いただく。 カテゴリーは、［それでもって・そのように］カテゴライズされる人のキャリアに［振ってかかってくる］たんなる偶発時だというわけではない。 →そのカテゴリーがレリヴァントになり・用いられる相互行為というものがあるはずなのであって、そこにおいてこそ、 →ゴフマンにとっては、「如何にしてそうしたカテゴリーはレリヴァントになるのか」という問が重要だったのだ。 、と。

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